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Abstract
We present a model where oligopolistic rms producing substitutes com-
pete for inputs in a decentralized market. Input suppliers are capacity con-
strained (or produce under exclusivity). Compared to a price-taking input
market, the incentive to foreclose downstream competitors not only leads to
higher input prices, but it also results in a higher aggregate amount of input
acquired. This novel feature mitigates the output reducing e¤ect of down-
stream market power and may even restore e¢ ciency in the unique (input)
market clearing equilibrium. Other equilibria where rms endogenously coor-
dinate on which suppliers to target result in excess input supply (involuntary
unemployment, if input is labor) and even higher input prices. Our insights
generalize to alternative vertical structures. JEL Codes: D43, L11, L13.
Key words: simultaneous auctions, targeted o¤ers, vertical linkages, invol-
untary unemployment.
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1 Introduction
Firms often compete with the same rivals in di¤erent, vertically connected, mar-
kets: say, upstream markets for inputs and downstream markets, where they sell
their output. When these rms have signicant market power, the resulting strategic
interaction can become complex and closely dependent on market microstructure.
In this paper, we take a fresh look at the deceptively straightforward scenario, where
the input is provided competitively by a large number of small (capacity constrained)
suppliers. Using a novel model of price determination, we show that the usual neg-
ative welfare e¤ects of downstream market power are mitigated through a feedback
channel to the upstream market that has generally been considered anticompetitive.
Our point of departure is the conventional wisdom that rms engaged in vertical
multi-market competition have an incentive to foreclose: to reduce the rivalspro-
duction by somehow starving them of input. Models often fail to capture the full
ramications of this observation.1 To illustrate this, assume for the moment that
the atomized supply of input is completely elastic. It may then appear natural
 though we will argue that perhaps incorrect  to model upstream competition
as rms simultaneously choosing quantities (as the input price is given). It is
then clear that a result of downstream market power is a lower output, resulting
in a lower input demand. We contend that the incentive to increase ones (input)
quantity in order to decrease the rivalsis seriously underestimated if we only take
account of the strategic substitutability arising from quantity competition.
Modelling competition in this restricted way implies that a rm cannot directly
a¤ect its rivalsinput levels. We believe that this is an unnecessary, and often unreal-
istic, constraint. To address this concern, we propose an alternative microstructure
that explicitly takes into account the rmsability and desire to foreclose.
The key feature of our model of the (upstream) market is that the same supplier
may be approached by multiple potential buyers simultaneously, even though she is
constrained to deal with at most one of them.
1We present a detailed discussion of the related literature below.
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By targeting specic suppliers, rms can a¤ect whether their purchase is at the
expense of their rivals. By directing their demand at the suppliers that the rivals
intend to use, they can potentially reduce the rivals input (and hence output).
When every rm can engage in such poachingactivity, the equilibrium strategies
incorporate defensive tactics: competitive foreclosure characterized by aggressive
competition for a subset of suppliers ensues.
We streamline bargaining by assuming that the rms make take-it-or-leave-it
o¤ers to the suppliers of their choice or, equivalently, each (unit-)supplier holds a
rst-price auction.2 Importantly, this mechanism is completely decentralized: each
supplier decides independently who to deal with, given the prices o¤ered to her by
the rms to which the latter are assumed to be fully committed.
A novel implication of competitive foreclosure relative to the traditional raising
rivals costscenario is that the higher price paid for input is accompanied by an
increased input purchase. The intuition is transparent even before we specify the
details of our model: traditional foreclosure is considered as an asymmetric situation,
where Firm 1 forecloses Firm 2 by capturing the lower part of the supply function,
thereby ostracizing its rival to its higher part. Faced with the higher cost, the
foreclosed rm purchases less input. In our set-up, the rms are trying to foreclose
each other. As a result of internalizing the externality, the willingness to pay for a
unit of input increases for both rms, leading to a bidding war, resulting in both
higher input prices and higher input volume (where the supply curve is shared
symmetrically). Put another way, the higher price results from a shift in the demand
curve, rather than a movement along it.
Our stylized model captures a wide range of scenarios. The inputs rms compete
for may be materials (e.g., mineral ore), parts, or even machinery.3 All we need
is a large number of small capacity constrained or exclusively dealing potential
2Our rms have market power, so they are likely to have bargaining power as well. Moreover,
as we will see, giving all the bargaining power to them is not crucial as, due to competition, they
will not be able to benet from it.
3In fact, for our purposes it is irrelevant whether the rms add any value: they could be
intermediaries.
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suppliers. Perhaps the most obvious example of such input is labor.4 But labor is far
from being unique in this respect. Advertising space for advertisers (on web pages,
in newspapers, in broadcasting breaks, etc.), or shows for pay-TV platforms are
among the less ordinary examples of input markets where our discussion is relevant.
When Netix landed in Europe and was able to sign some of the successful TV
dramas into its streaming service, local operators, like Canal Plus and Sky, felt it
necessary to nd ways, including banding together with operators in other markets,
to outbid their new rival for some of the shows.5 That willingness to pay for an
input that would otherwise go to the competitor is higher is well known. What
we argue in this paper is that the increased willingness to pay also results in more
input purchased and so in larger output in the nal market. Continuing with our
example, the same pressure from Netix made BBC change its policy of signing new
seasons only after previous ones had been aired (and so have been fully evaluated).6
The insights obtained apply to cost reducing inputs as well. After all, what is
needed is that the foreclosed inputincreases prots, not necessarily output. For
instance, this is the case if the input suppliers are scientists or labs that could pro-
vide process-innovations.7 Hiring such a supplier (or buying their exclusive patent)
at the expense of the rival is one way of raising the rivals costa known example
of foreclosure that, other things equal, increases the rms prots. The literature
4The insights that we obtain are most relevant for labor markets with identiable individuals
like top management, academics, professionals, etc, where personalized deals are common.
5See "Netix Global Growth Faces New Threats", in The Wall Street Journal, Jan 17, 2016.
(On-line edition, consulted February 9th, 2017.)
6See "How European Networks Are Trying to Fight O¤ Streaming Rivals", The Hollywood
Reporter, online version September 8, 2016, (consulted on February 9th, 2017). The entry of
Netix and other operators, like Amazon, into local markets was linked to a sharp increase in
drama production. As the agent Pascal Breton put it in 2016, ... all these players in Europe will
battle to buy the best European shows. In the next three years, the market will grow dramatically,
probably double.(Variety, October 15th, 2016, on-line edition consulted February 9th, 2017.)
7Following the interest shown by Facebook in the Israeli startup Waze, Google managed to bid
and acquire the company whose main expertise was using satellite pictures to generate maps and
tra¢ c data. Peter Cohan, an analyst of the startup market, wrote in http://www.forbes.com that
"(a)ccording to Haaretz, Googles interest in Waze stems principally from its aim of blocking
Facebooks growth." (June 9th, 2013; online version consulted on February 9th, 2017.)
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on R&D has long recognized the strategic incentives associated with R&D through
the e¤ect that a reduction in costs has on output market behavior and so on prof-
its.8 What we add to this literature is an additional strategic incentive, this time
associated with the direct competition for R&D assets.
We capture this wide variety of applications via our simultaneous bidding model
in the input market and a reduced form model of the output market, which simply
maps the realized input purchases into revenues for the rms.
Our rst result conrms the intuition that competition drives out price discrim-
ination: in equilibrium, even with targeted o¤ers and the suppliers reservation
values being public, all traded units sell at the same price. Next, we show that in
the benchmark case, where the rms do not a¤ect each other in the product mar-
ket,9 the unique equilibrium of our targeted-o¤er input market institution leads to
the competitive outcome (in that market). When rms do have downstream mar-
ket power over each other, the market-clearing equilibrium is di¤erent. In it, rms
target the same suppliers. The resulting willingness to pay exceeds the competitive
one as it includes a conjectural variationof  1: being chosen by a supplier over
a rival not only increases a rms input by one unit, but relative to the counter-
factual it automatically decreases the rivals input by one unit as well. Due to this
increase in the rmsinput demand, both the still common input price and, by
market-clearing, the aggregate input increase.
This is not the only equilibrium when externalities are present. However, all
other equilibria exhibit supra-competitive levels of aggregate input as well together
with even higher input prices than the market-clearing equilibrium. Consequently,
8This e¤ect is at the heart of the literature on the relationship between competition and the
incentives to innovate, in the tradition of Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980). (See a survey
of this early literature in Reinganum, 1989.) Also, this is the e¤ect that plays an important role in
the literature that directly addresses the interaction between the incentives to pursue R&D and to
foreclose rivals in the traditional vertical relations literature. (See, for instance, Stefanides, 1997,
Banerjee and Lin, 2003, and Chen and Sappington, 2011.)
9This could be because they sell in di¤erent markets (either in physical or in product space) or
because the downstream market is competitive.
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these additional equilibria are characterized by excess supply: there are suppliers
that do not trade who would accept less than the market price. These equilibria
arise from the coordination-game nature of the interaction: as rms want to make
o¤ers to the same suppliers, if the other rms stop targeting a few suppliers it is
a best response not to make an o¤er to them either. Buying from them would no
longer have the added value of reducing a rivals supply. It is this wedge between the
value of a unit of input that would otherwise be employed by a rival and one that
would not be, that explains the possibility of prices above (marginal) reservation
prices.10
When the input in question is labor, these additional equilibria are actually char-
acterized by unemployment. Note that the rationale behind wages above reservation
wages is quite di¤erent from the rationales discussed in the literature on e¢ ciency
wages. Here it is not the productivity of the worker that is incentivised by the wage,
rather an output market externality is added to the value of that productivity, when
the o¤er is to a contested worker.
In markets for unskilled labor, it may be argued that our pricing model, which
posits personalized o¤ers, is less realistic. If we assume that rms cannot target
their o¤ers, for instance, because workers are anonymous, we obtain as the only
equilibrium the full-employment one. Nevertheless, we show that, introducing dy-
namics to the anonymous model together with the possibility of using employment
in one rm as a labelthat allows imperfect targeting may reestablish equilibria
with unemployment.
To complement the abstract nature of the preceding analysis, we fully develop
a model of the output market with di¤erentiated products and constant returns,
that ts the reduced form model that we use in the analysis. We also use simple
models to demonstrate that our results go beyond competition for inputs, however
broadly construed. Indeed, noting that the crucial characteristic we need is that
10We assume that product demand and input supply are generated by di¤erent people. This is
in contrast with general equilibrium (macro) models where consumers and workers are the same
that display multiple equilibria and unemployment via di¤erent rational expectations equilibria
(see Silvestre, 1993, for an excellent survey).
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the market where competitive foreclosure arises closes before its vertically related
counterpart, we discuss two alternative vertical structures, competition for retailers
and competition for production orders, where the same insights apply.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the many di¤erent
strands of the related literature. Section 3 presents the model of input market com-
petition and the (reduced form) model of product market revenues. In Section 4, we
analyze the benchmark case where a rms supply decision does not a¤ect the other
rmsrevenues, and obtain the competitive (input market) outcome. Section 5 then
introduces output market interaction, obtains the new market-clearing equilibrium,
and characterizes the rest of the equilibria. In Section 6 we discuss how the results
change when rms cannot target their wage o¤ers. Section 7 illustrates our main
model with micro-founded revenue functions, and Section 8 discusses how our ideas
apply to alternative vertical structures. Finally, Section 9 concludes. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
2 Related literatures
There is an extensive literature on foreclosure (see Rey and Tirole, 2007, for an
excellent survey), mainly concerned with vertical contracting. In that literature,
downstream rms with market power also have an incentive to lure upstream rms
into contracts that make it harder for rivals to obtain their inputs. The focus there is
on whether these incentives are stronger than upstream rmsown incentives not to
enter into these deals, or on the contractual forms that may a¤ect competition to the
contracting partiesadvantage. Instead, we have in mind an upstream market where
suppliers do not possess market power, and cannot sensibly deal with more than one
buyer. Foreclosure here appears through quantity purchases, rather than through
from a competition law point of view possibly problematic vertical restraints.
Even more importantly, the literature on foreclosure compares a fait accompli with
the absence of foreclosure, while our model emphasizes the very process of competing
to foreclose, which need not lead to an overall winner.
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Also closely related, is a strand of the literature on auctions with downstream
externalities (see, e.g. Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000). In this tradition, Mayo and
Sappington (2016) explicitly tackle the foreclosure incentives of rivals bidding for a
unit of input, and study conditions for the outcome of the auction to be e¢ cient.
These papers do capture the incentives to foreclose in a bidding context, in scenarios
with a single overall winner, not unlike the literature on foreclosure mentioned above.
We take these incentives to a more nuanced scenario where winners in one battle do
not emerge as winners in the war: competitive foreclosure may lead to a symmetric
outcome. As a result, our model allows us to analyze the e¤ects of foreclosure
incentives not just at the margin (and hence on prices) but also on quantities, both
in the input and the output market, an issue that by design is absent in their and
the literatures analysis.
A few papers have modeled the interaction between generic input and output
markets when rms have market power in both.11 Stahl (1988) is among the rst
to analyze the e¤ect on output market outcomes of intermediaries competition
for upstream inputs. Intermediaries compete in prices for inputs that then are
sold downstream. Price competition leads to no excess supply, by denition: all
supply at the posted price is assumed to be taken by the intermediary making
the o¤er. When ties are broken in a particular way (one winner takes all, even
when tying), then the output price may be larger than Walrasian, but single-price,
market clearing in the input market is always guaranteed. In his quest to analyze the
e¤ects of vertical mergers, Salinger (1988) proposes a model where there is Cournot
competition between the sellers in both markets. As rms are assumed price takers
in the input market, his model is the ideal straw man for us. Spulber (1996) has
price setting intermediaries, but he too assumes away externalities. Yanelle (1997)
studies a model of bank competition that shares some interesting features with the
present one. She also obtains that there is a range of equilibria, at di¤erent prices
(rates) for funds. When banks and borrowers (entrepreneurs) compete with each
other for funds, lenders face a coordination problem: borrowers and banks can fulll
11The literature on inter-market interactions when rms act in multiple output markets is abun-
dant. A classical reference here is Bulow et al. (1985).
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their o¤ers if they get su¢ cient other lenders on board. Thus multiplicity ensues.
We also obtain multiple equilibria for inputs as the result of a coordination problem,
but in our case input buyers, not their sellers, are the ones that face this problem.
Competition in the output market is the origin of the externality in the input market.
More recently, Es½o et al. (2010) discuss quantity competition in this same setting,
but assume exogenous (inelastic) supply of input and e¢ cient allocation of this input
to rms. The insight that market power may partially defeat itself through the
linkage between the two vertically related markets, a central tenet in our analysis,
is absent in these papers.
Our pricing model in the input market is also related to McAfee (1993), Peters
and Severinov (1997), Burguet and Sákovics (1999), Julien et al. (2000), and De
Fraja and Sákovics (2001), among others.12 All these papers consider similar insti-
tutions involving personalized o¤ers, with the main di¤erence that they all assume
that each buyer can only participate in a single auction. Thus, price di¤erentials
(intra- or inter-rm) are a consequence of di¤erent realizations of (mixed-strategy)
equilibrium participation in these auctions. In contrast in our model, rms are
allowed to make (and required to honor) o¤ers at several auctions simultaneously.
Note that our model is distinct from those that also model competing retailers
bidding for input but consider the supplier as a monopolist (Marx and Sha¤er,
2007, 2016, Miklos-Thal et al., 2011, Rey and Whinston, 2013). In those papers,
each retailer has a single possible contract, so foreclosure equates exclusion. Also
the retailers are concerned with reaping the industry monopoly prot in equilibrium,
which is far from feasible in our model. If we considered a trade union responding
to the o¤ers of the retailers, we would not have the internalization of the external
e¤ect, which is the basis for our result.
Our insights relate to many specialized elds. As a taster, let us discuss some of
12Our model could be interpreted as each supplier auctioning o¤her services. Lang and Rosenthal
(1991) study a nite, discrete model of bid-competition very similar to the one we use in this
paper, except that bids cannot be targeted. Pepall and Richards (2001) have a single star supplier
(plus a price taking fringe) for whom rms bid. Palomino and Sákovics (2004) have clubs bidding
for high and mid-level talent.
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the most relevant, related labor literature. Bhaskar et al. (2002)and the references
there provide abundant evidence of wages above reservation values, as some of the
equilibria of our model exhibit. Of course, e¢ ciency wage models rank high as
explanations of this phenomenon.13 Here, we have assumed away all traditional
motives behind the rationale for e¢ ciency wages. Related to this paper, Shy and
Stenbacka (2015), allow for di¤erent wage o¤ers to incumbent and poached workers.
Their motivation is the prot and welfare implications of anti-poaching policies
when switching workers are a¤ected by both a productivity change and a worker
specic cost of switching. Switchers may obtain wages above the wages of stayers,
so that wage di¤erentials result from switching frictions (which we do not have).
Other studies have related product market imperfections with unemployment, when
labor (union) has bargaining power in wage negotiations.14 This bargaining power
allows suppliers to capture part of rmsrents in the output market, and so drive
wages above reservation wages. In our model, suppliers are price takers. (In fact,
our model has equilibria where suppliers appropriate no rents.) Wages are above
reservation wages as a consequence of rmsattempts to capture competitorsrents.
Kaas and Madden (2004) also analyze the feedback between product and input
market power, and also obtain the possibility of unemployment as an equilibrium
outcome. Firms rst post wages and then, after observing all choices, announce
a maximum amount of labor they are willing to hire at their posted wage and,
possibly, rationing follows. This two-stage competition for labor allows high wages
to be equilibrium: any deviation downwards triggers a punishment by other rms
in the form of large demands of labor that drives the deviator out of the market.
These punishments themselves are sustained by the threat to a failing punisher
of being also driven out of the market. Thus, in a sense unemployment is the result
of collusion among rms, with collusion-type mechanisms to sustain it.15 We do not
need this particular, two-stage model of the input markets or the endogenous price
13See, for instance, Yellen (1984).
14See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). Koskela and Stenbacka (2012) and Booth (2014) are recent
examples of this literature.
15They require to have at least three rms competing, so that each deviant is disciplined by (at
least) two punishers, each one disciplining each other.
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rigidities that it postulates at the time contracts are o¤ered. Rather, high prices
are the consequence of rms ercely competing with alternative buyers that are also
output market competitors.
3 The base model
There are two identical rms competing both in the input and the product markets.
To avoid complications arising from indivisibilities, we assume that there are a
continuum of unit-suppliers of a homogeneous input, indexed by z 2 [0; 1]. Their 
exogenous and common knowledge reservation prices imply an aggregate supply
function, denoted by t = S 1(p), w.l.o.g. assumed to be weakly increasing in price,
p, so that the inverse aggregate supply function16 is S(t).
The input market operates as follows: each Firm i sets a price schedule, Pi(z),
z 2 [0; 1], specifying a personal price o¤er to each supplier.17 Firms are committed
to their o¤ers: if an o¤er is accepted the rm must honor it in all contingencies.18
Let P denote the full prole of price schedules. The suppliersdecisions are simple:
they observe their o¤ers, and accept (one of) the highest if it is no less than their
reservation price. Given P and the acceptance strategies of the suppliers,19 we let
the measure of suppliers enlisted by Firm i be ti(P) and the total cost for Firm i
be bi(P ).20
16In the tradition of economics, we allow for vertical segments in the inverse supply correspon-
dence.
17If a rm does not make an o¤er to some suppliers, we simply set the price o¤ered to zero.
18O¤ the equilibrium path this may require a rm to purchase more input than it needs, though
it still has the option not to utilize it for production.
19For simplicity, we suppress the supplier stategies in the notation.
20By analogy to the Law of Large Numbers, we assume that these expected values exist and
coincide with the realized values with probability 1. For example, letting 1i (p;P ) and 
2(p;P )
represent the measures of suppliers who receive a highest acceptable o¤er p only from Firm i and
from both rms, respectively, and assuming indi¤erent suppliers mix fty-fty
ti(P ) =
Z 1
0

2(p;P )
2
+ 1i (p;P )

dp;
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Once the inputs are purchased, the rms produce. To maximize generality, we
do not model the production process and the product market competition in detail.
We simply assume that given any amount of input bought by the rival rm, tr, each
rms net revenue as a function of its own input level, to, is R(to; tr). That is, a
rms payo¤, given the acceptance strategies of the suppliers and the vector of price
schedules P , is
R(to(P ); tr(P ))  bo(P ):
It is natural to assume thatR is (weakly) increasing in to and (weakly) decreasing
in tr, for example, due to free disposal. On the other hand, for some standard
models of market competition, this payo¤ function is not concave. Thus, we make
alternative assumptions on R instead. Below, the subscripts of R represent partial
derivatives with respect to the corresponding variable.
Assumption 1 R1(to; tr)  0 and R2(to; tr)  0. Moreover, i) R11(to; tr) < 0, ii)
R12(to; tr)  0, and iii) R11(to; tr)  2R12(to; tr) +R22(to; tr)  0.
Assumption 1iii) implies that a rms revenue is concave in the amount of input
that it poaches from the rival rm. This is a su¢ cient condition that allows us
to characterize the set of symmetric, pure strategy equilibria using the rst-order
approach. As we will see in Section 7, typical Cournot or Dixit models satisfy this
assumption.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the input may reduce the production cost,
instead of increasing output. For instance, suppose that t represents the number
of scientists working in the process-innovation division of the rm, and model this
number as a continuum.21 Suppose that the rms (constant) marginal cost of
production is a decreasing function of this number, ci(ti). Then, we recover our
and
bi(P ) =
Z 1
0
p

2(p;P )
2
+ 1i (p;P )

dp:
21Likewise, t could represent the number of patents of cost-reducing innovations up for (exclusive)
contracting.
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basic model letting
Ri(to; tr) = i(ci(to); cj(tr));
where i is the prot of rm i net of R&D-division salaries. For instance, if rms
produce homogeneous goods and compete downstream in quantities, then i is the
Cournot prot function.22
As a nal preliminary, let us present a result that shapes the nature of equilibrium
strategies.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium where both rms are active, the law of one price holds.
In other words, despite the exibility a¤orded by the model to o¤er di¤erent
prices to di¤erent suppliers, all the accepted o¤ers in equilibrium must be at a com-
mon price.23 Note that this does not imply that we could prescind with personalized
o¤ers, as the feasibility of coordinating o¤ers on the same suppliers matters. Addi-
tionally, personalized o¤ers play an important role as possible deviations, reducing
the number of equilibria. We will discuss these issues in more detail below.
4 The competitive benchmark: no externality
We start our analysis by looking at the benchmark situation, where there is no
strategic interaction in the product market (that is, R2(to; tr) = 0) for example,
because the rms sell in di¤erent markets. In this case, the partial derivative of net
revenue with respect to own input, R1(to; tr), captures a rms marginal willingness
to pay for input when it has already bought to units. Therefore, the market clearing
or competitive outcome is dened by
R1(t
c; tc) = S(2tc) = pc: (1)
22It is easy to construct linear-demand, logistic-shaped (in t) marginal cost examples that also
satisfy Assumption 1.
23This result need not generalize to more rms. For example, a four rm market does have an
equilibrium where two di¤erent prices are paid.
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Remark 1 It is important to note that, if the rms were input price takers, the
market-clearing outcome would still be determined by (1) even when rms interact
in the product market: if a rm cannot a¤ect the amount/price of input its rival
buys then it does not matter for the rms behavior in the input market whether
its revenues depend on the rivals input level.
Remark 2 A further relevant observation is that this competitive input market
equilibrium is only competitive in a partial equilibrium sense. Firmswillingness
to pay for input does not equal price times marginal product of input when the
product market is not competitive. The input market clears and the price equals
rms willingness to pay but less input is bought than in the fully competitive
scenario (c.f. Stahl, 1988).
The following result shows that our price setting game uniquely implements the
competitive outcome:
Proposition 1 In the absence of downstream interaction, the unique equilibrium
outcome is market clearing: all input is bought at the competitive price, pc, and
rms purchase their competitive input demand, tc.
In the symmetric equilibrium,24 each rm o¤ers pc to the same set of suppliers,
comprising twice the amount of input it wishes to buy at this price so that each
supplier willing to accept pc receives two o¤ers and accepts either of them with equal
probability. Note that the fty-fty mixing is endogenously derived, not assumed.25
If the supply function is strictly increasing, the symmetric equilibrium strategy is
equivalent to naming a posted price, as the equilibrium clears the market.26 Given
this, no rm would like to attract another supplier as it would have to pay a price
24Of course, there are asymmetric equilibria where both rms and suppliers use heterogeneous
strategies as well, leading to the same outcome.
25Proposition 1 as well as our subsequent results generalizes to asymmetric rms, but in that
case the unique (supplier-symmetric) equilibrium requires the suppliers to use a di¤erent mixed
strategy. See Proposition 1 in Burguet and Sákovics (2017).
26With fully elastic supply (S(t)  r ) the argument is slightly di¤erent but the equilibria look
the same.
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above pc, the rmsmarginal willingness to pay. Similarly, no rm would prot
from shedding a supplier, since their marginal product equals pc. Finally, there is
no way to buy from any supplier cheaper than for pc either, conrming the equilib-
rium. Uniqueness can be established by observing that in equilibrium, practically
by denition, there cannot be a positive measure of input bought for any price other
than pc.
This last observation explains why rms coordinate on making o¤ers to the
same set of suppliers. In equilibrium, any supplier, z, who only received a single
o¤er would have to be paid her reservation price. But if this price were lower than
some price paid by the rival, then the rival would prot from not buying from that
supplier and buying from z for " more than her reservation price instead. As a
result, competition drives out price discrimination, despite reservation prices being
common knowledge.
5 Equilibria with externalities
We now investigate the e¤ects of (shared, product) market power on the equilibrium
outcome in the input market by assuming that R2(to; tr) < 0.27 This externality
does not only imply that the revenue of a rm depends (negatively) on the input
level of the rival. It has an additional more intricate consequence. When we
totally di¤erentiate R with respect to to we obtain
dR(to; tr)
dto
= R1(to; tr) +
tr
to
R2(to; tr):
Thus, due to the externality, tr
to
, the e¤ect an innitesimal change in a rms own
input level has on its rivals (holding the rivals strategy constant), becomes relevant.
The crucial observation is that this e¤ect is determined endogenously. Buying from
an additional supplier has a di¤erent e¤ect on a rms revenue depending on whether
the supplier would have sold to the rival rm the supplier is contested or not.
27Note that we are implicitly assuming that (in equilibrium) the rms are using for production all
their purchased input. While there are situations where this is not the case, the gain in generality
is not worth the increase in complexity and the loss in focus.
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In the former case tr
to
=  1, while in the latter tr
to
= 0. Therefore, the marginal
value of attracting a supplier away from a rival is the sum of two (positive) e¤ects:
R1(to; tr) and  R2(to; tr). At the same time, the marginal value of attracting an
uncontested supplier is simply the increase in net revenue made possible by using
the extra input, R1(to; tr) just as in the benchmark case. This increase is lower
than when obtaining the input from a contested supplier, as it does not include
the increase in revenues caused by the reduction of input and thus output of
the competitor. As we will see, in equilibrium each rm will seek to make o¤ers to
the same set of suppliers as its rival  resulting in all contracted suppliers being
contested and consequently they have the higher marginal willingness to pay for
all of them.
Proposition 2 When R2(to; tr) < 0, the competitive outcome (tc; pc) is no longer
supportable in equilibrium. Nonetheless, there exists a unique market-clearing equi-
librium outcome, with each rm buying from t suppliers, paying them the same
price p, where (t; p) solve
R1(t
; t) R2(t; t) = S(2t) = p: (2)
Note that t and p are the market-clearing input level and price, when the
two rms make o¤ers to the same set of suppliers. When each supplier is contested,
decreasing to will increase tr by the same amount. Similarly, the best way to increase
to is to lure some of the suppliers away from the rival. Thus, indeed the marginal
valuation is given by R1(to; tr) R2(to; tr). Market clearing then follows from similar
arguments as in the benchmark model.
To see why the competitive outcome is not an equilibrium, simply observe that
R1(t
c; tc)   R2(tc; tc) = pc   R2(tc; tc) > pc, so the rms have an incentive to out-
bid their rival for some of the suppliers that would sell to its rival with positive
probability. The following corollary is also immediate.
Corollary 1 p  pc and, therefore, t  tc. Moreover, the rst inequality is strict
unless supply is innitely elastic, while the second is strict unless it is fully inelastic.
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In other words, the rmsmarket power in the product market leads to higher
prices and increased input purchase. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, imperfect com-
petition downstream leads to a more competitive outcome than the competitive
benchmark. The size of this e¤ect increases with the elasticity of supply and the
size of the production externality.
Remark 3 Our unique market-clearing equilibrium outcome could be imple-
mented as one of the many market-clearing equilibria of a posted-price model, where
the rms are required to buy from any supplier that accepts the price. However, the
intuition behind all those equilibria is completely di¤erent, it has nothing to do with
the externalities, rather the diminished incentives to outbid a rival, as that would
lead to all the (willing) suppliers switching to accept the rms o¤er. (c.f. Dastidar,
1995). Tellingly, the competitive equilibrium outcome of Proposition 1 is also one
of the posted-price equilibria.
Proposition 2 characterizes a focal equilibrium with supra-competitive prices
and quantities. Typically, there exist other equilibria as well, but they lead to
even higher prices and consequently to excess supply: some suppliers who would be
willing to trade at the market price are not approached by either rm.
Proposition 3 Unless either28 R(t; t) tp = 0 or the elasticity of supply is zero,
there exists t < t such that for each t 2 [t; t], there exists an equilibrium where
both rms o¤er
p = R1(t; t) R2(t; t)  S(2t) (3)
to (the same) 2t suppliers among those with reservation price below p, and make no
acceptable o¤er to the rest. Moreover, all symmetric equilibria must be characterized
by such behavior for some t 2 (tc; t).
As we have seen in Proposition 2, when 2t units of input are purchased, the
market price equals the marginal suppliers reservation price, as well as the marginal
28Non-negativity is guaranteed by Assumption 1iii. Given that we are studying rms with
(downstream) market power, one might expect positive prots. However, as we will see in Section
7, it need not be the case in extremely simple and standard models. That is, input competition
may eliminate oligopoly rents.
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willingness to pay of the rms. On the other hand, for t < t, the inequality in (3) is
generically strict and thus we have excess supply. The root cause for this departure
from market clearing is yet again the externality we have been discussing. A supplier
who would be willing to accept the equilibrium price may not receive an o¤er from
Firm 1 for the mere fact that she does not receive an o¤er from Firm 2. This situation
arises when Firm 1 is already buying from su¢ cient suppliers so that p > R1(t; t).
That is why we have R1(t; t)  S(2t) and, therefore, tc  t. See Figure 1.29
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Remark 4 One might think that, when the rms see the availability of supply
at lower prices, they would wish to buy some if only they had the option of a second
round of o¤ers. This, however, is not the case. The rms can predict exactly how
much supply they will purchase in equilibrium, so if they wished to make acceptable
o¤ers for additional units, they could have done so to start with. We will return to
the potential relevance of dynamics in the next section.
The extent of multiplicity, and thus the maximum distance of equilibrium out-
comes from the market-clearing price (upwards) and quantity (downwards), posi-
tively depends on the elasticity of supply and on the size of the production exter-
nality which is likely to decrease with the number of rms.
Thus, market power in the product market may create segmented competition
for otherwise homogeneous suppliers. Suppliers targeted by rival rms become more
29As we have mentioned, we need Assumption 1 to guarantee that a symmetric equilibrium
exists, not that an equilibrium with excess supply exists. Indeed, concavity of the revenue function
in the ow of input from the rival rm has two implications that count here. Firstly, concavity
guarantees second order conditions for the strategies identied by a rst-order approach. This rst-
order approach always identies candidate symmetric equilibria with and without excess supply. If
the revenue function is C2, strict local concavity at a candidate equilibrium with market clearing
implies strict concavity for neighboring candidate equilibria with excess supply. Secondly, concavity
guarantees that a local best response (maximum) is also a global one. Absent concavity, the
rst-order approach is not appropriate, whether we refer to an equilibrium with or without excess
supply.
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valuable than untargeted suppliers. A type of input for which excess supply 
unemployment has been widely discussed is labor. Proposition 3 advances a
novel, additional explanation for this phenomenon.
In a market for unskilled labor, our model of pricing competition, which includes
the possibility of targeting wage o¤ers, is not very plausible, particularly when rms
are not large in that market. For this reason, in the next section we discuss how our
insights are a¤ected when we exclude the possibility of targeting o¤ers at particular
suppliers.
6 Anonymous suppliers
Assume that rms can decide how many o¤ers they make and at what prices, but
cannot address particular o¤ers to particular suppliers, thereby rendering (perfect)
coordination impossible. Thus, even in equilibrium, rms can only have a prob-
abilistic idea of whether the suppliers receiving their o¤ers are contested or not.
As we will see, this modication of our model eliminates the equilibria with excess
supply of the previous section, while it retains the non-competitive market-clearing
equilibrium as the unique equilibrium where the law of one price applies.30
Suppose that the total mass of input is T .31
Proposition 4 Under supplier anonymity, in the only (rms) pure-strategy, sym-
metric equilibrium with a single price, the non-competitive market-clearing outcome,
(t; p), emerges.
The intuition behind the result is simple: if both rms send o¤ers with the same
price, a rm attracts any supplier that gets no other o¤er plus a portion of the
suppliers that get the competing rms o¤er. By sending o¤ers with slightly higher
30As this is but a robustness check under anonymity we do not investigate the existence of
equilibria where there can be input bought at di¤erent prices.
31Until now, there has been no need to specify the total mass of input, as the tail endof the
supply curve played no role: those suppliers would never be targeted.
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prices, the rm may increase (discrete jump) the conditional probability that an
attracted supplier has received an o¤er from the rival, unless all the suppliers do get
one. Thus, the only possible equilibrium must have all rms sending o¤ers to all
suppliers, in which case the reservation price of any non-enlisted supplier must be
no less than the market input price. That is, we must have market clearing. When
all the suppliers receive an (identical) o¤er, anonymity becomes irrelevant: rms
know that all the suppliers are contested, so their willingness to pay is the same as
under targetability.
Remark 5 It is worth emphasizing that a higher price cannot be an equilibrium
outcome, not because this would give rms incentives to pay lower prices and still
attract (uncontested) suppliers, but rather the opposite: rms would have incentives
to increase their o¤ers and so compete more ercely for (some) suppliers.
This observation indicates that the high-price equilibria of the model with tar-
geting are not artifacts of the inability of rms to react to competing rmso¤ers
(by enlisting uncontested suppliers). In fact, as we show next, if we allow some
dynamics in our model we can reconcile supplier anonymity with equilibrium excess
supply.
The dynamic model is based on the observation that even under anonymity 
the mere fact of supplying a rival rm constitutes a label that may be used to target
a group of suppliers (c.f. Shy and Stenbacka, 2015). If rms have the opportunity
to react to rival o¤ers by targeting new o¤ers to the rivals suppliers, then as we
will show the possibility of endogenously segmented input markets reemerges.
Let us maintain the assumption that o¤ers are binding for rms, but suppliers can
freely walk out of a contract. Also, suppose that, before production takes place but
after all initial o¤ers have been made and the suppliers have responded, a randomly
selected rm has the opportunity to send new o¤ers. This time, the selected rm
can target (as a group) a subset of the suppliers that have tentatively accepted an
o¤er from the rival rm.32 Both assumptions are sensible if, for instance, the input
32That is, anonymity is maintained within the group of suppliers enlisted by the rival and the
rm can choose how many o¤ers to send within that group.
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is labor.
In addition to Assumption 1, let us assume that R22 > 0. Also, to simplify the
analysis, let us assume that each rm makes all o¤ers with the same price, although
di¤erent rms may choose di¤erent prices to o¤er. Further, to avoid repetition,33
we assume that in the second period only the suppliers hired in the rst period may
receive o¤ers.
Proposition 5 In the anonymous game, where each rm is equally likely to have an
(exclusive) chance to target new o¤ers at some proportion of the suppliers enlisted
by the rival, there exist equilibria where rms buy input t each at price p, where
p > S(2t). That is, there are equilibria with excess supply.
To understand the intuition behind this result, recall that excess supply equilibria
were not possible without a second move because a rm had incentives to deviate
and make o¤ers to fewer suppliers with a slightly higher price, so that it ended up
buying the same amount of input as before. By doing so, the rm would signicantly
reduce the input bought by the rival. Hence, that deviation would result in lower
aggregate input whether or not there were a second period. Now, if the other rm
has an opportunity to react, which occurs with 50% probability, it will basically
ip the input distribution, so that it would be the deviating rival who would
su¤er the loss. The joint prots of the two rms would drop, and (in the most
favorable case), the expected prots of the deviating rm would still only be 50%
of those joint prots.
7 Microstructure: the output market
In the preceding sections, we have used a reduced-form approach to modelling pro-
duction and product market competition, positing general revenue functions. Here,
33Given the analysis previously displayed in this paper, it should be clear that this feature would
be part of an equilibrium anyway.
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we display a worked out example based on Dixits (1979) quantity competition model
with di¤erentiated goods, which in the limit coincides with a linear Cournot model.
Thus, assume that the representative consumer has utility function U(m; q1; q2) =
m+
P
i
 
aqi   b2q2i   cq1q2

, where qi represents the (quality or) quantity of output
of Firm i, and m is the rest of consumption numeraire. The resulting inverse
demand for Firm is product/service is
pi(qi; qj) = a  bqi   cqj:
We also assume that rms operate constant (normalized to unit) returns to scale
technologies.34 Then, their net revenues will be
Ri(ti; tj) = (a  bti   ctj) ti:
Thus, Assumption 1 is satised, as in this model R11(t1; t2) =  2b < 0, R12(t1; t2) =
 c < 0, and R11(t1; t2)  2R12(t1; t2)+R22(t1; t2) =  b+ c, which is negative as long
as the price of each good is more responsive to changes in its own quantity/quality
than to changes in the quantity/quality of the other good.
We may now compute the set of all symmetric equilibria that we have discussed
in previous sections. For simplicity, assume the supply of input is innitely elastic:
S(t) = r < a for all t > 0. Then, the market-clearing equilibrium, discussed in
Proposition 2 and characterized by R1(t; t)  R2(t; t) = a   2bt = r leads to
both rms purchasing
t =
a  r
2b
units of input. Meanwhile, the upstream competitive purchase of input would
be
tc =
a  r
2b+ c
:
That is the level at which R1(t; t) = a  2bt  ct = r. Note that indeed tc < t.
We can now obtain the set of symmetric equilibria that Proposition 3 refers to.
34This set-up is particularly well suited to analyze the competition between service providers,
like consultancy companies, investment banks, security rms, cleaning services providers and even
universities.
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Corollary 2 In the linear Dixit model with constant returns to scale and innitely
elastic input supply, the set of symmetric-equilibrium input levels is [t; t], with the
corresponding price a  2bt  r for any given t, where
t =
a  r
2b+ c  c2
2b c
:
Note that tc < t, so all equilibria involve a higher than competitive volume of
input purchases. At the same time, for all equilibria except the market-clearing one,
this higher purchase of input is accompanied by a higher input price (p = a 2bt > r).
Thus, there exist suppliers who would accept a price strictly below the market
price but dont get an o¤er. If labor is the input, these suppliers workers are
unemployedin this industry.
It is straightforward to see that the e¢ cient (i.e., total surplus maximizing,
given service demand and input supply) input and output (per rm) would be
t = a r
b+c
> t. That is, the most e¢ cient of all the equilibria is the market clearing
one, t. Moreover, in this model total industry prots 2(R(t; t)  pt) are aligned
with total surplus: they are increasing in t as well.
Let us consider the equilibrium set as we vary the degree of product di¤erentia-
tion. The market clearing equilibrium level of input is una¤ected by c, while both
the e¢ cient (and prot maximizing) level of input and the competitive one are de-
creasing in the level of di¤erentiation. The lowest possible level of input is U-shaped,
while the corresponding maximum is constant. This is displayed in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Of particular interest is the limit, as c! b. That limit case is the homogeneous-
product, Cournot competition. We obtain as a limit t = t = t = a r
2b
> a r
3b
= tc,
with input price equal to r (and rms making zero prot). Thus, considering the
feedback across markets, market power in the output market is completely bid away
in the input market, and so e¢ ciency is fully restored in this particular case.
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8 Alternative vertical structures
Up to now, we have studied competitive foreclosure focussing on input markets 
even if the nature of the input could be broadly construed. This seems the natural
environment as the relevant feature of the extensive form is that the market exposed
to foreclosure operates prior to the othermarket. Nonetheless, there are alter-
native scenarios where we can have competitive foreclosure in one market before
another market clears and, therefore, our model and its implications apply with
only minor modications. Let us discuss two salient such vertical structures here.
8.1 Competition for contracts/orders
While in terms of production inputs must precede outputs, when we talk about
contractual commitments this need not be the case. In fact, it is common practice 
for example, Tesla sells its new models through a preorder system to secure orders
for the nished product before production and even prior to purchasing the inputs.
To see how our model can be adapted to this scenario, suppose that our rms
bid for unit contracts to their clients rst. They do so as in our personalized pricing
model: each rm simultaneously o¤ers a contract (a price) to as many clients as
they choose, possibly di¤erent ones for di¤erent clients. Each client then selects an
o¤er to accept, if any. After signing these contracts, the rms obtain the necessary
inputs in a market where they have market power. That is, they are oligopsonists
in this input market. The cost function for each rm would then depend on the
input purchases of both rms, C(to; tr). For instance, if the input inverse supply
function is Z(t), technology is constant returns to scale with only one input one
unit of input for each unit of output , and rms compete in quantities in the input
market,
C(to; tr) = toZ(to + tr):
It is immediate that, substituting  C(to; tr) for R(to; tr), and  D(t) for S(t), this
model is homomorphic to our baseline model. Thus, the equilibrium conditions for
the benchmark and market-clearing cases will be C1(t; t) = D(2t) and C1(t; t)  
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C2(t; t) = D(2t), respectively. Of course, now C2 is positive a rms costs are
higher if its competitor buys more input so C1(t; t)   C2(t; t) < C1(t; t). As the
(inverse) demand is downward sloping, this will lead to higher overall production
when rms engage in competitive foreclosure. Similarly to the input competition
case, we can also sustain non-market-clearing equilibria, where there is unsatised
demand (see Figure 3).
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
8.2 Competition for points of sale
Competition for exclusive retailers (or shelf space) is a¤ected by similar vertical-
linkage incentives but in reverse. As an illustration, consider again our linear Dixits
(1979) model, but suppose that the number of varietiesor locations is endoge-
nous. Each varietyi corresponds to the good sold by one retailer, and the represen-
tative consumer has a utility function U(m;q) = m+
P
i(aqi  b2q2i )  c2
P
i qi
P
j 6=i qj,
where q is the vector of all quantities. The resulting inverse demand for retailer is
product/service is still linear, pi(q) = a  bqi   cQ i, where Q i is the total output
of all varieties other than i. Retailers who secure supply compete in quantities.
They buy their necessary input/product from one of our two rms manufactur-
ers who produce a homogeneous good at zero production cost. Firm i incurs a
cost of dealing with tj retailers, C(tj). Firms compete for retailers by asking for a
personalized (two-part tari¤ with a zero variable part and xed) payment, wi. The
manufacturers payo¤ is the di¤erence between its tari¤ revenue and the cost C(:).
(Thus, we are assuming homogeneous manufactured product/input and symmetric
di¤erentiated retailers.) Solving the simple quantity competition among retailers,
we obtain retailer is prot (gross of tari¤ payments) as
(t) =

a
2b+ (t  1)c
2
b:
It is now straightforward to repeat our analysis to nd that, if each rm took the
rivals number of retailers as given, then the competitive equilibrium would be
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characterized by 0(2t)t+(2t) C 0(t) = 0 and each rm would ask its retailers for
a tari¤w = (2t). As in our baseline model, this would not be an equilibrium in the
game with personalized o¤ers when manufacturers take into account externalities.
Indeed, in that case manufacturer 1 would be willing to make such o¤er to one
retailer that receives no other o¤er, but would be willing to undercut manufacturer
2 as long as (t1 + t2) > C 0(t1). The market clearing equilibrium would then be
characterized by (2t)  C 0(t) = 0 and each rm would ask the same 2t retailers
for a tari¤ w = (2t). Since 0 < 0, this means that, in equilibrium, more retailers
will be enlisted and more output produced.35
9 Conclusion
We have explored the consequences of linkages between market power in the output
market and outcomes in upstream markets. When suppliers are viewed as sepa-
rate markets, rms have incentives to attempt to restrict rivals access to input,
even when it is in abundant supply. The resulting competitive foreclosure leads to
higher input prices and higher input levels, alleviating the anti-competitive e¤ect of
(downstream) market power.
There are a number of ways in which our model could be generalized. For
example, note that we need not fully specify which subset of suppliers the rms
choose to bid for. Obviously, a number of productivity-irrelevant characteristics
(gender, race, rst letter of last name, etc.) could serve this purpose and in that
respect our model could also be a useful vehicle for modelling discrimination (c.f.
Mailath et al., 2000).
An extension of the analysis to more than two rms could add further interesting
consequences, for example segmentation of the input markets with di¤erent prices
being paid for identical input, depending on the subset of competitors for them.
Finally, interpreting p as the per unit price o¤ered, our model accommodates
35Su¢ cient convexity of C or su¢ ciently large a relative to b and c, (so that 3tc > b) guarantee
that this value is well dened.
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(small) suppliers with heterogeneous capacities (or workers of di¤erent productivi-
ties). Similarly, we could also consider a nite number of suppliers. Such a reinter-
pretation comes with a cost though: Not only does the math become messy because
of indivisibilities, but we can no longer assume that the rms know ex ante the
quantity they will purchase in equilibrium. This uncertainty could become relevant
in a dynamic extension of our model, since ex ante uncertainty about the equilib-
rium input quantity would give rise to a desire for further trade ex post, unlike in
our base model.
It is revealing to note that the targetability of o¤ers is not necessary for the high
price/input-level result. Rather, it is the explicit consideration of each suppliers
decision over which o¤er to accept that matters. Targetability does lead to additional
equilibria, which exhibit even higher prices, but lower input level, leading to excess
supply. Due to the foreclosure e¤ect, rms are led to endogenously coordinate and
make o¤ers to the same subset of suppliers, while their willingness to pay for an
uncontested supplier is strictly lower. From an applied point of view, our analysis
underscores the importance of carefully understanding the interplay of market-power
rents and upstream competition for the markets involved. Competition for inputs
may not only transfer rents from downstream rms to suppliers, but it may actually
reduce the size of these rents, and in so doing restore, at least partially, e¢ ciency. It
is well understood that assessing the e¤ects and costs of market power, for instance
in merger analysis, cannot be satisfactorily done without paying due attention to
how the involved rms compete for their suppliers. This paper highlights one so far
neglected intricacy that may characterize this competition.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that in equilibrium and in expectation a
measure  > 0 of suppliers accept o¤ers in [0; b] and a positive measure of suppliers
accept o¤ers in [c; d] for some 0  b < c  d. Take a rm that o¤ers in [c; d]
to a positive measure and denote by  > 0 the measure of suppliers it enlists at
these prices in expectation. Similarly, denote by  2 [0; ] the expected measure of
suppliers this same rm enlists for prices in [0; b]. Let  = min(   ; ). Assume
rst that  < , and therefore the rival enlists some suppliers for prices in [0; b].
Also,  > 0. Now if our rm deviates and outbids its rival in [0; b] by " < c  b 
for enough suppliers so that it ends up in expectation with + suppliers for prices
in [0; b+ "], while it withdraws enough o¤ers from [c; d], so that it enlists   from
that interval, it increases its expected payo¤: net revenues from the product market
either stay the same (if the suppliers given up in [c; d] go to the rival, both rms
will enlist the same amount of suppliers as before) or increase (if the rivals amount
of input is decreased due to the deviation) but the input bill is strictly lower. If
 = , and therefore  = 0, then the other rm does not enlist any supplier at wages
in [0; b], while, by the above argument, it cannot be making o¤ers above b either,
implying that it does not buy input at all, contradicting the assumption that both
rms are active.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. First, we show that rms o¤ering pc to 2tc suppliers in such a way that
each supplier with reservation price below pc receives exactly two o¤ers of which
she chooses one with equal probabilities is indeed an equilibrium. Suppose that
Firm 2 behaves according to the hypothetical equilibrium strategy, and consider the
best response of Firm 1: P1(:). There are two types of supplier to target: there are
measure 2tc suppliers with an o¤er of pc and a reservation price less than that, and
the rest of the suppliers who have a reservation price above pc. Obviously, the rm
should hire suppliers in increasing order of their now perhaps determined by Firm
2´s o¤er reservation price, until this price equals marginal revenue. Thus, by the
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denition of tc, the equilibrium strategy is indeed a best response.
We now show that there exists no other equilibrium outcome (with deterministic
price schedules). Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a positive measure
of suppliers who get a price strictly below pc in equilibrium. Then there must exist a
rm who would be willing to change a positive measure of its o¤ers and instead o¤er
" more to these suppliers, as the aggregate demand at infra-competitive reservation
prices strictly exceeds the supply of suppliers. Consequently (almost) no supplier
can be enlisted for less than pc. Similarly, assume, by way of contradiction, that
there is a positive measure of suppliers who get a price strictly above pc. Then there
must be suppliers with a reservation price strictly below pc who do not receive an
acceptable o¤er, as the aggregate demand at supra-competitive reservation prices
is strictly less than the supply of suppliers. Consequently, (almost) all the enlisted
suppliers must be paid pc. As no rm is willing to acquire more than its competitive
demand at pc, there are always suppliers willing to sell at this price, so each rm
must buy up to its competitive quantity.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. To see that (tc; pc) cannot be sustained by an equilibrium, note that as
pc = R1(t
c; tc) < R1(t
c; tc) R2(tc; tc), any rm would prefer to outbid its rival by "
on some of the suppliers and lower its o¤er to zero for other, so that in expectation
it buys the same amount of input, but the rival buys strictly less. The rest of the
proposition follows from Proposition 3, proven below.36
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Note that Assumption 1, ii) and iii) and S 0  0, ensure that (t; p) is well
dened. We prove the rst part of the proposition by contradiction. Suppose there
is no interval [t; t] such that for each t in the interval the equilibrium depicted in the
36Note that Assumption 1iii) guarantees that prots are non-negative at t. Indeed,
R(t; t)  wt =
Z t
0
((x) R1(t; t) R2(t; t)) dx
where (x) = R1(x; 2t x) R2(x; 2t x), and the result follows noticing that (x) is decreasing
from Assumption 1iii) and the inside of the integral is zero at x = t.
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proposition exists. That implies that there exists a sequence tn " t, where, for all
n, it is not an equilibrium that both rms o¤er a price pn = R1(tn; tn) R2(tn; tn) to
the 2tn suppliers with lowest reservation price, who them accept each of them with
probability 0:5. Clearly, no supplier has a protable deviation in this case. Thus,
it must be that one rm, say Firm 1, does. The response of Firm 1 amounts to
nding quantities  of input acquired from the pool of 2tn who receive o¤ers from
Firm 2, and  of input acquired from the pool that does not receive o¤ers from Firm
2. Indeed, that can always be done by o¤ering pn to 2 of the former37 and their
reservation price to suppliers in the interval (2tn; 2tn + ). For given  and , the
prot of Firm 1 is then (arbitrarily close to)
1(; ) = R( + ; 2tn   )  pn 
Z 2tn+
2tn
S(x)dx; (4)
with derivatives
d1(; )
d
= R1( + ; 2tn   ) R2( + ; 2tn   )  pn (5)
and
d1(; )
d
= R1( + ; 2tn   )  S(2tn + ): (6)
Note that d
1(;0)
d
= R1(; 2tn   )   R2(; 2tn   )   pn = R1(; 2tn   )  
R2(; 2tn   )  R1(tn; tn) + R2(tn; tn). Since d1(tn;0)d = 0, and R is concave in 
from Assumption 1iii), we conclude that a best response given  = 0 is  = tn.
Thus, if there is a better response than the putative equilibrium strategy,  = tn,
 = 0, it must be with  > 0.
Let the sequence of best responses to ftng be denoted fn; ng. This sequence
is bounded, since R(t; t)   pt > 0 and 1(; ) < 0 for large enough  and/or
. Thus, it has accumulation points. Suppose (0; 0) is an accumulation point for
this sequence. Then, for some n large enough 1(n; n) is arbitrarily close to
R(0; 2t) = 0. This cannot be a best response, since 1(tn; 0) is arbitrarily close to
R(t; t)  pt > 0.
37If  > tn then Firm 1 can o¤er p+ " to  of these suppliers.
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Thus, at any accumulation point
b; b, we have bt = b + b > 0. That means
that there exists a subsequence of fn; ng such that for n large R2(n+n; 2tn n)
is arbitrarily close to R2(bt; 2t   b) < 0. Since n > 0, (6) equals zero evaluated at
(n; n), so that R1(bt; 2t   b) = S(2t + b)  S(2t). Also, since (5) is not larger
than zero at these values (zero if n > 0), R1(bt; 2t   b)   R2(bt; 2t   b)  p =
R1(t
; t)  R2(t; t) = S(2t). As R2(bt; 2t   b) < 0, the two previous inequalities
are contradictory. Therefore, there cannot exist a sequence tn " t, where, for all n,
Firm 1 has a better response than the proposed strategy when Firm 2 follows that
strategy. This in turn proves that there has to exist a non-degenerate interval [t; t]
in which the proposed strategies are indeed an equilibrium.
We now show that there is no other class of symmetric equilibria in pure price
schedules. By Lemma 1 the o¤ers by both rms are identical for all the suppliers
that are enlisted. Suppose all these suppliers receive an o¤er di¤erent from R1(t; t) 
R2(t; t), where t is the amount of input acquired by each rm. If the price o¤ered
is larger than R1(t; t)   R2(t; t), then a rm would prot from withdrawing some
of its o¤ers, whereas if it is lower than that amount, then a rm would prot from
increasing its o¤ers to a small mass of suppliers that accept with positive probability
its rivals o¤ers, and so stealingthem from its rival. Thus, both rms must o¤er
the same price p = R1(t; t)   R2(t; t) to 2t suppliers, and each must hire half of
them. These 2t suppliers must accept, so their reservation price must be below p.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Let Firm 2 play its equilibrium strategy, and so o¤er p to a number of
suppliers q2.38 Consider Firm 1s strategy consisting of sending o¤ers with the same
price p (say, b of them) or slightly higher ones (say, a of them), and no o¤ers
with lower prices. Any of the a o¤ers would be accepted by the supplier receiving it
if her reservation price is lower than p, whereas each of the b ones would be accepted
38For a symmetric equilibrium with prices p, any o¤er below or above p must be rejected. O¤ers
above since o¤ers cannot be targeted will always have a positive probability of being accepted.
O¤ers below too, unless the rival rm o¤ers price p to all workers. Symmetry would imply that
both rms do that, eliminating the possibility of o¤ers below p too.
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with probability 2T q2
2T
by these same suppliers. Indeed, since the equilibrium is
symmetric, half the suppliers who receive both o¤ers must choose Firm 1s o¤er in
equilibrium. Moreover, and more importantly, since suppliers cannot be targeted by
assumption, even after the deviation by Firm 1, half of those who still receive the
same o¤er from both rms must choose Firm 1s. The probability that any given
o¤er of p made by Firm 1 is to a supplier who also receives an o¤er from Firm 2 is
q2
T
. In addition, the probability that the o¤er is to a supplier who does not receive
an o¤er from Firm 2 is T q2
T
, and then the o¤er will be accepted if p exceeds the
suppliers reservation price. Similarly, we can compute the probability that Firm 2s
o¤er is accepted by a supplier with reservation price below p when these strategies
are used, as 2(T a) b
2T
. Thus, for a = 0, b > 0 to be a best response for Firm 1, these
values would have to maximize39
R

S 1(p)
T

a+
2T   q2
2T
b

;
S 1(p)
T

2(T   a)  b
2T
q2

 pS
 1(p)
T

a+
2T   q2
2T
b

:
The rst order conditions for a = 0, b > 0 require
R1   q2
2T   q2R2 = p  R1  
q2
T
R2;
where we have omitted the arguments of the functions. Since R2 < 0, these con-
ditions are incompatible unless q2 = T . For b = q2 = T , the input acquired by
each rm is t = S
 1(p)
2
, so that we have demand equal to supply and the rst order
conditions imply
R1(t; t) R2(t; t) = p = S(2t);
as we wanted to show.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. We will show that there exist t and p with S 1(p) > 2t, and a symmetric
equilibrium where both rms contract input t in the rst period with o¤ers p, and
39The expression is written as if all o¤ers a included price o¤er p. Note that the prots obtained
by the rm with a o¤ers just above p can be arbitrarily close to that expression.
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send no new o¤ers in the second period. For that to be the case, each rm must
send q o¤ers of p, satisfying
t = q
S 1(p)
T
 2T   q
2T
: (7)
Suppose that Firm 2 does so, but Firm 1 deviates and sends q1 o¤ers with price
p1. Consider p1  p, rst. It is straightforward that such a deviation can only be
protable if it leads Firm 1 to acquire t1 = q
1
T
S 1(p1) > t. Firm 1s deviation also
a¤ects how much input Firm 2 obtains:
t2(t1; p1) = q
S 1(p)
T

1  t
1
S 1(p1)

: (8)
The rst term in the right hand side is the measure of o¤ers sent by Firm 2, the
second is the probability that a supplier that receives one has a reservation price
below p, and the third term is the probability that one such supplier has not received
one of the o¤ers sent by Firm 1.
First, it may be Firm 1 who has a chance to send new o¤ers. Then it solves the
problem
max
10

R(t1 + 1; t2(t1; p1) 1)  p1	 :
The rst order condition is
 = R1(t
1 + 1; t2(t1; p1) 1) R2
 
t1 + 1; t2(t1; p1) 1  p = 0: (9)
The objective function is concave (in 1) and continuous in [0; t2(t1; p1)]. Let the
solution be b1. Observe that
db1
dp1
=  
@t2
@p1
[R12  R22]
@=@1
 0;
since the denominator is negative and @t
2
@p1
> 0.
Now assume it is Firm 2 who can make new o¤ers. It solves a similar problem,
namely
max
22[0;t1]
R(t2(t1; p1) + 2; t1  2)  p12:
This optimization problem is also concave in 2, with rst order condition
R1(t
2(t1; p1) + 2; t1  2) R2(t2(t1; p1) + 2; t1  2)  p1 = 0: (10)
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Let the solution be e2. Similarly as before, de2
dp1
 0.
Let us now consider the best deviation (with p1 > p) by Firm 1 in period 1. The
optimal (p1; t1) solves
max
p1p;t1t
1
2

R(bt1;bt2)  p1t1   p(bt1   t1) +R(et1;et2)  p1et1	 ;
where bt1 = t1 + b1, bt2 = t2(t1; p1)  b1, et1 = t1   e2, and et2 = t2(t1; p1) + e2. The
derivative of the objective function with respect to p1 is
1
2
"
 t1 + @bt1
@p1
 
R1(bt1;bt2)  p+ @bt2
@p1
R2(bt1;bt2)#
+
1
2
"
 et1 + @et1
@p1
 
R1(et1;et2)  p1+ @et2
@p1
R2(et1;et2)# :
Note that @bt1
@p1
= d
b1
dp1
= @t
2
@p1
  @bt2
@p1
. Also, note that @et2
@p1
= d
e2
dp1
+ @t
2
@p1
=   @et1
@p1
+ @t
2
@p1
.
Thus, the expression above can be written as
1
2
"
 t1 + d
b1
dp1
 
R1(bt1;bt2) R2(bt1;bt2)  p+ @t2
@p1
R2(bt1;bt2)#
+
1
2
"
 et1   de2
dp1
 
R1(et1;et2) R2(et1;et2)  p1+ @t2
@p1
R2(et1;et2)# :
As we mentioned, de2
dp1
 0, and @t2
@p1
> 0 in (8). Also, note thatR1(bt1;bt2) R2(bt1;bt2) =
p, from (9). Thus, this whole expression can be seen to be negative if
R1(et1;et2) R2(et1;et2)  p1  0:
Note that et1 + et2 = bt1 + bt2 = t1 + t2(t1; p1), and so if et1 > et2, just as in the case of
(9), the inequality follows. Thus, we must have an optimizer at p (+) if et1  et2.
Note that, once again resorting to Assumption 1, taking into account the rst 
and secondorder condition for the optimal choice of Firm 2 (10) and the fact thatet1 + et2 = t1 + t2(t1; p1)  2t, indeed et1  et2.
Thus, any (optimal) deviation simply sets an amount of input contracted, t1 +
t2(t1)  2t, and then results in each rm choosing how much of it to acquired at wage
p with probability 1/2. I.e., the best deviation results in a symmetric (expected)
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situation, and so in the same expected prots, for both rms for each t1. In the
region with t1  t, and so t1 + t2(t1)  2t, the expected prots are largest when,
t1 = t, and so t2(t1) = t, since for any t0 > t,
R(t; t)  pt > R(t0; t0)  pt0 
 1
2
R(t0 + ; t  ) + 1
2
R(t0   ; t+ )  t0p:
Indeed, the rst inequality follows from the fact that at given price p, the derivative
of R(t0; t0)  pt0 with respect to t0 is
R1(t
0; t0) +R2(t0; t0)  p < R1(t0; t0) R2(t0; t0)  p;
and R1(t0; t0)   R2(t0; t0) is decreasing in t0. Thus, for p = R1(t; t)   R2(t; t), that
derivative is negative. The second follows from Assumption 1iii), i.e., concavity of
R(t0 + ; t0   ) in .
Now, consider a deviation with p1 < p. Given p1, t1 would be given by
t1 = S 1(p1)
q1
T
(1  q
T
):
That is, t1 can be chosen to be any number in
h
0; S
 1(p1)
T
(T   q)
i
. Observe that
(7) implies that for p su¢ ciently close to p, q is arbitrarily close to T , so that this
interval is arbitrarily small. That is, t1 is arbitrarily small and so R(t1; t2)   p1t1
arbitrarily small. That is, smaller than R(t; t)   pt. Also, the maximum of R(t1 +
; t2   )  p1t1   p in  is attained arbitrarily close to  = t, since t1 + t2 is
arbitrarily close to 2t. Thus, the losses in case it is Firm 2 who is allowed to send
new o¤ers more than o¤set any possible gains in case Firm 1 is allowed to readjust
input. This proves the result.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Suppose Firm 2 sends 2t o¤ers with price p = a 2bt, and let x represent the
total input that Firm 1 obtains, and  the input that it obtains (by sending o¤ers
 p but larger than p) from the pool of suppliers that receive o¤ers from Firm 2.
Since the uncontested suppliers are paid r, Firm 1s prot 1(x; ; t) has a positive
slope in  if and only if (c.f. (4) in the proof of Proposition 3)
x >
p  r
c
() t > tc = a  r
2b+ c
:
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Thus, given x, the optimal , (x), equals x if the inequality is satised and 0 if it
is reversed.40 Also, 1(x; (x); t), is concave in x both to the right and to the left
of p r
c
, and its derivative to the right of that value when (x) = x is zero at
x = t. Thus, we have a symmetric equilibrium if and only if the left derivative with
respect to x, evaluated at x = p r
c
is non-negative. This is the case if
t  t = a  r
2b+ c  c2
2b c
:
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